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Abstract:  We carry out a cluster randomized trial among 979 households in 
rural El Salvador to test whether shoe donations exhibit negative impacts on 
local shoe markets. Households in half of our communities were given a pair of 
children’s shoes at baseline (treatment communities), while all households 
were given coupons that could be used for shoe purchases at a local shoe store.   
Although point estimates on coupon redemption and difference-in-difference 
estimations indicate shoe purchases to be slightly lower among households 
receiving the donated shoes, we find no statistically significant difference in 
market shoe purchases between treatment and control households.  
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1. Introduction 
Development and relief organizations who donate in-kind goods to the poor in developing 
countries face increasing criticism that in-kind donations may negatively impact producers and 
retailers in local markets, thus undermining long-term development.  While donations may 
have a positive direct impact on recipients, in significant quantities they also may reduce local 
prices to the detriment of suppliers.1 Moreover, in a context in which prices are relatively sticky, 
even limited donations may curtail purchases from domestic sellers. The purpose of this research 
is to try to rigorously ascertain if shoe donations to low-income countries undermine local 
markets in this way.   
We study the impact of shoe donations on local markets via a randomized trial in which we 
obtained data on 5,607 individuals in 979 households across 18 communities in El Salvador using 
baseline and follow-up surveys. Our experiment was carried out in four of World Vision 
International’s Area Development Program (ADP) districts.  Approximately 56% of these 
households belong to nine communities in which households received a pair of children’s canvas 
shoes at the beginning of our study. The 44% of households in the remaining nine communities 
functioned as a control group and received a pair of the shoes only after the follow-up survey.  
Every household, in both treatment and control groups, received a pair of coupons for shoe 
purchases that could be redeemed in a local shoe store. The donated shoes used in our study are a 
black canvas children’s loafer. Because it was unclear whether the donated shoes in our study 
would substitute in the market for less expensive or more expensive shoes, we analyze the impact 
of shoe donations on both of these markets. Hence one of the coupons was valid for inexpensive 
shoes, costing $10 or less, while the other coupon was valid for more expensive shoes, costing 
more than $10 but less than or equal to$20.   
We estimate the impacts on local shoe markets using two methods. First we look at 
differences in coupon redemption rates between treated and control households in our sample to 
examine the impact on markets for both less-expensive and more-expensive shoes.  Second we 
use a difference-in-differences approach using reported shoe purchases by households for each 
member of the family to examine whether, as a result of our intervention, shoe purchases for 
children aged 6 to 12 (compared to shoe purchases for other members of the family in treated 
households) declined relative to control households.  This provides a second measure of market 
impact since the donated shoes were intended for children in this age group. 
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In order to mitigate problems of over-testing, researcher bias, data mining, and multiple 
inference, we created a pre-analysis plan of all of the hypotheses, methodology, and regression 
specifications used in this research.  These were registered and time-stamped in a hypothesis 
registration at the MIT Jameel Poverty Action Lab before any data analysis occurred.  The 
advantage of this hypothesis registration, from a scientific point of view, is that as researchers we 
were thus able to “tie our hands” in the analysis of our data.  In this way, our research could be 
carried out in the most transparent manner possible and regression specifications could not be 
skewed toward the direction of more or less favorable results.  Thus the hypotheses, general 
methodology, and even the detailed econometric specifications that we present in our paper 
conform to that which is listed in our JPAL hypothesis registry, which can be found online.2 
1.2 Existing Literature 
 Evidence in the literature regarding the impact of development aid more generally has 
offered mixed reviews at best regarding its long-run impact on economic development. 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005) carry out a meta-study of 97 research papers on the impact of 
aid in developing countries and find that at best there seems to be a small impact of aid on 
economic growth.  Easterly et al. (2003) and Easterly (2006) also report little positive 
association between aid and economic growth in developing countries.  Exploring the "Black 
Box" of foreign aid, Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) conclude that many forms of aid, 
including gifts in kind, are often ill-conceived, do not constitute an optimal use of resources, and 
that the relationship between aid and development is fragile and tenuous at best.  In her 
bestselling book, Dead Aid, Moyo (2009) contends that most types of international aid undermine 
growth by replacing domestic markets, create poor incentives for government officials, retard 
the development of functional political systems and markets, and in the process create their own 
development traps. 
In contrast, however, Collier (2006) argues that sub-Saharan Africa would have fared far 
worse during the decades of low growth without foreign aid programs. Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Tarp (2004) Minoiu, Reddy (2010), and Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) find that foreign 
aid promotes generally positive long-run effects on economic growth.  However, the more 
nuanced conclusion from this set of papers is that any positive impact on economic growth highly 
depends on context and type of aid.  
Research that studies the impact of development aid in the form of in-kind donations has 
generally found that, while potentially benefiting recipients, in-kind donations have a negative 
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impact on local markets.  Some of this literature has looked at the impact of food donations on 
local economies. Employing a seemingly unrelated regression model that uses monthly data 
from three markets and three commodities, Tadesse and Shively (2010) study food aid shipments 
in Ethiopia over a 10-year period.  Their results indicate that food shipments in the previous 
year reduced prices in each of these producer and consumer markets. Interestingly, they find a 
detrimental effect on local prices and local food production particularly when shipments exceed 
the 10% threshold of local production; below this level the negative impacts of in-kind food aid 
appear to be benign.  They conclude that food shipments need to be undertaken more carefully, 
and perhaps restricted in cases where in-kind food donations replicate domestically produced 
commodities.  
There are two papers preceding this research that examine the impact of in-kind apparel 
donations on the development of the apparel sector; both study effects in Africa. First, Brooks 
and Simon (2012) provide an extensive review of the phenomenon of used clothing imports into 
Africa and its relationship to the development of the apparel sector, but contend that data 
availability makes causal impact between the two difficult to identify.  Frazer (2008) examines 
the impact of used clothing imports in sub-Saharan African countries, asking why bottom-round 
textile production has not emerged as a leading sector of development in Africa as it has in other 
regions of the world such as Asia.  He finds that used apparel donations have had a strongly 
negative impact on domestic apparel producers in Africa. Using an instrumental variable 
strategy that exploits geographic differences between countries, Frazer finds that while imports 
of cheap clothing benefit consumers, he estimates that used-clothing donations accounted for a 
40% decline in production and a 50% decline in employment in the apparel industry.  
2. The Impact of In-Kind Donations on Market Purchases: Theoretical Framework 
There are a number of conceivable ways that in-kind donations could affect local household 
consumption patterns and domestic markets. How donations affect household consumption 
patterns depends on the nature of preferences given by the household’s utility function.  
For example, suppose that households have Cobb-Douglas utility and maximize utility over 
N goods each denoted by   , where ∑   
 
      
           ∏   
   
   ,      (1) 
subject to the budget constraint ∑     
 
     , where    is the price of each good and   is 
income, with N associated first-order conditions 
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Here, an in-kind donation of one unit of a given good j increases the marginal utility of other 
goods relative to good j, and hence household purchases of good j ought to fall. This is the 
theoretical case that pertains to those who contend that in-kind donations should exhibit 
negative effects on domestic producers and suppliers of good j. 
 There are, however, other possible impacts from in-kind donations on household 
consumption patterns.  Suppose that households exhibit preferences for equality in consumption 
between members of the household, for example between each of the household’s children. Each 
of the M members of the household consumes N goods, and suppose household utility exhibits 
Cobb-Douglas preferences between household members for any particular good, but utility is 
additive across goods such that 
           ∑ ∏    
    
   
 
   ,     (2) 
where ∑    
 
     , with associated first-order conditions 
    
    
     
         
    ∏  
   
               . 
In this case if one member of the family h receives an in-kind donation of some good j, it 
increases the marginal utility of the household for other members of the family receiving that 
same good j.  Here we would expect additional household purchases of the in-kind donation 
good j to increase relative to other goods, these new purchases of good j then allocated to family 
members who did not receive the donation.  An example of this could conceivably occur with 
shoe donations, where one child receives a pair of shoes through an in-kind donation, and parents 
desire to reallocate purchases from other goods toward providing shoes for other siblings who 
did not receive the donation. 
A third case may occur in which the in-kind donation has no marginal relation to the 
utility of other goods consumed by the household.  An example might be laptop computer 
donation to households who view a computer as a new product with no substitutability or 
complementarity with existing products in the household consumption portfolio.  Consider a 
utility function similar to (1), in which other goods affect the marginal preferences of other goods 
except that we now include an additively separable good Z, a new donation-in-kind good:  
           ∏   
         ,     (3) 
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Here, our first-order conditions are identical to the first case, except for good Z for which 
    
    
  
            . 
Because preferences between good Z and    are additively separable, we would not expect 
donations to exhibit any positive or negative effects on domestic markets for the latter, nor for 
good Z, since it would not be consumed by the household anyway given sufficiently high   .  In 
the example of the computer donation, while receipt of the computer might increase household 
utility, it has no effect on the budget allocation of the household. 
3. Experimental Setting and Estimation Equations 
3.1 Field Site 
The experiment was carried out in tandem with the TOMS shoe-giving program that 
functions as a key part of the company’s social mission.  TOMS promises customers to give a 
pair of shoes to a needy child one-to-one for every pair of its shoes purchased by customers.  The 
donated shoes were similar to the shoes that TOMS typically sells to its regular customers.  The 
shoes were black slip-on loafers with a canvas upper containing an elastic band for comfort and 
flexibility on the upper ankle. The shoes have a durable synthetic rubber sole.  
Our fieldwork was carried out in four World Vision’s Area Development Program (APD) 
regions in El Salvador.  Within each of these four ADPs we worked with four to six 
communities, randomly choosing half of the communities to receive the children’s shoes at 
baseline.  The remaining communities received the shoes at follow-up.   
All of the participating communities in the TOMS were very similar within each of their 
respective ADP regions; indeed there were only slight differences even across regions. All 
municipal centers had small stores (usually operated out of homes), schools, health clinics, and 
home-restaurants.  Nearly every community had its own school with reasonably adequate 
resources (2-4 teachers, books and materials, desks, etc.)  Every municipality had a functioning 
health clinic with usually one doctor and multiple Promotores de Salud (Health Promoters).  The 
Health Promoters were responsible for traveling to communities to check on patients.  Our 
communities tended to be similar in levels of asset ownership, materials used for homes, type of 
agricultural work, and cultural norms.  Adolescent boys typically worked in subsistence and 
cash crop agriculture; adolescent girls frequently collected water, carried out numerous 
household chores, and watched younger children.  
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Throughout the duration of the study, we observed and informally interviewed people 
about the culture of shoe wearing among children.  El Salvador is not a country in which 
children do not own shoes.  Nearly every child owns a pair of shoes or sandals, and in our sample 
88% of children owned two or more pairs of shoes, but this was concentrated at a low level of 
shoe ownership; in our study approximately 80% of children owned either two or three pairs of 
shoes, one often being a very inexpensive pair of flip-flops or sandals.  Indeed, it appeared that 
most of the families, even the very poor ones, could afford a pair of shoes or sandals.  Only two 
children from age 6 to 12 in our study out of the 1,492 studied had no shoes at all at baseline.  
Almost all of the shoe vendors with whom we contracted in our experiment sold 
inexpensive imported footwear.  Some communities would acquire footwear from NGO 
donations, government handouts, or would purchase with remittance money.  When we 
observed children or adults walking barefoot, we learned that it was rarely because they didn’t 
own a pair of shoes, but instead because they preferred to walk barefoot.   
The response from children was strongly positive regarding the TOMS shoe donations: 
90% of children who received the shoes wore them, with mean use at 4.54 days per week. The 
modal response was 7 days per week (see Table 1), indicating that although shoe ownership was 
prevalent, the shoes clearly filled a void.  Children also reported that they liked the shoes.  
Approximately 92% of children in the treatment group reported that they liked the shoes at 
follow-up, 3% said they liked them “a little bit” and 4% didn’t like the shoes.  (During the study 
we heard some boys comment that they did not like the TOMS shoes because they looked like 
“pregnant women shoes.”)  Mothers frequently reported to us that the TOMS shoes would wear 
out very quickly due to the environment and heavy use by the children.  Many parents and 
children would have preferred to have a sturdier, hiking-style shoe.   
Across El Salvador, including our study communities, children are required to wear 
school uniforms and black dress-shoes to school.  Some schools allow children to wear the 
donated black TOMS shoes, which many children found to be more comfortable than their 
school shoes.  Most children reported taking off their school shoes when they arrive home from 
school, then playing or doing chores barefoot or with sandals.  Playing soccer is a very common 
activity, and to play, children would typically put on sneakers or the TOMS shoes.  Table 2 
gives a breakdown of children’s activities while they were wearing the donated shoes, where 
simply wearing the shoes around the house (33.0%), playing in them (31.4%), or using them for 
school (20.5%) were the most frequent activities. 
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3.2 Experiment 
The four ADP regions in our study, Nueva Vida, San Julian, Torre Fuerte, and Tierra 
Nueva, were chosen based on the following criteria: First, our chosen ADPs were to achieve wide 
coverage of El Salvador in geographical terms. Second, they had to be in areas of extreme rural 
poverty prevalence. Third, they must not have received World Vision shoe donations in the 
previous year. All communities had child sponsorship and community development programs 
operated by World Vision.  
The randomization of the treatment and distribution of the shoes was a cluster 
randomization carried out at the community level within each region after a baseline survey of 
the treated and control communities.  Randomization needed to be clustered at the community 
level in order to avoid jealousies that would stem from a fraction of households in a community 
receiving shoes at baseline while others not. Cluster randomization results in a reduction of 
power, especially in instances when intraclass correlation, , is high.  We estimated intraclass 
correlation across communities for shoe purchases during the six months previous to the 
baseline survey based on a one-way ANOVA, finding  = 0.033, relatively low due to the relative 
similarity in our communities.  Thus the loss in statistical power is relatively minor from the 
cluster randomization. 
Our field experiment randomized the dispersal of the shoes in nine of these communities 
after the baseline survey, with half of the communities in each ADP randomly assigned to 
treatment.  The follow-up survey was undertaken 3 to 4 months after baseline.  Households 
that formed part of the study in each village were those having children with in the 6 to 12-year 
shoe-donation recipient age.  Each household with children in the appropriate age range was 
surveyed in each community.  Shoes were distributed to the control communities after obtaining 
follow-up survey information.   
The unit of analysis for our coupon experiment is based on coupon redemption at the 
household level, while the unit of analysis for our differences-in-differences estimations is for 
shoe purchases at the individual level within households.  The head of households provided the 
information obtained in the survey. Balancing tests over key household demographic and 
economic variables between treatment and control communities are presented in Table 1 and 
include parental education, household size, average household age, log of landholdings, 
electrification of the household, minutes to the contracting shoe store, home having a dirt floor, 
number of children under 10 years old, baseline shoe purchases, and ownership of cell phones and 
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televisions.  There were no statistically significant differences between treatment and control 
households except for dirt floor (at the 5% level), indicative of a successful randomization. 
In the follow-up data taken 3 to 4 months after baseline survey and intervention,  
household heads were interviewed to obtain data on shoe purchases, while the second layer of 
data came from the results of the coupon experiment. In our coupon experiment, we allocated 
two discount coupons to households in both treatment and control communities: one of which 
could be redeemed for the purchase of inexpensive shoes costing $10 or less, and the other could 
be redeemed for more expensive shoes, costing more than $10 and less than $20.  In the first two 
ADP regions, our coupons offered discounts of $1 for the former and $3 for the latter. In the 
second two ADP regions, household heads randomly drew coupon discounts of 75%, 50%, and 
25% for both types of coupons following the protocol of Meredith, Robinson, Walker, and 
Wydick (2013).  The type of coupon allocated in the second two ADPs was altered to increase 
the redemption rate over that which was realized in the first two ADPs and estimate how 
redemption rates varied with the degree of discount, i.e. implicit price.  In the same way, one 
coupon could be redeemed for less expensive shoes, and one for the more expensive shoes. 
We worked with local shoe vendors, who were compensated for the redeemed coupons.  
These shoe vendors operated small stores that specialized in shoes, and in some cases other types 
of sports clothing and equipment. The vendors turned over redeemed coupons to field 
researchers, where each coupon was stamped with household information so it could be matched 
easily to the survey. Thus coupons were either redeemed or not redeemed, and this is the primary 
measure we use to determine market impacts of the shoe donations. We believe the vendor data 
to be highly reliable, but we also included a question on the follow-up survey regarding whether 
the family had redeemed either of the coupons.   
As an additional impact estimation strategy, we use a difference-in-difference estimation 
to examine the difference between purchases of shoes for children (6-12) during the 3-4 months 
between baseline and follow-up and purchases outside this age group, and then compare this 
difference between treated and untreated communities. In these estimations we use reported shoe 
purchase data rather than coupon redemption data. We implement this difference-in-difference 
estimation because purchases outside of this 6-12 age group should be unaffected by the shoe 
donation treatment.  
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3.2 Empirical Specifications 
We estimate the empirical specifications as laid out in our JPAL pre-analysis plan and 
hypothesis registry.3 For our first measure of market impact that uses our coupon experiment, 
we estimate 
          
                 (4) 
where     signifies coupon redemption,    
   are control variables that describe household 
characteristics, including education of parents, distance to shoe store, average household age, 
number of young children, and indices of dwelling quality and asset ownership.4  T is an 
indicator of whether the household lives in a treatment community,    is an ADP (region)-level 
fixed effect (which contains 4-6 communities), and     is the error term.  Market impact is 
captured by  . We estimate (4) using the linear probability model.  We estimate these equations 
for both inexpensive (price  $10) and expensive (<$10 price  $20) shoes because there is a 
question about whether the donated shoes are closer substitutes for inexpensive shoes (e.g. 
Crocs, flip-flops), or more expensive shoes, such as the kind worn by children to school and 
church. 
For our second measure of market impact that compares purchases across family 
members and treated/control communities, we estimate the difference-in-differences equation: 
          
                     (5) 
where     are shoe purchases during the 3-4 month period before follow-up, T represents being 
in a treated community and C represents being a member of the children’s group (age 6-12) that 
is a target of the shoe donation.  We would measure the impact of the donation then by the 
coefficient  . Again we estimate (5) via OLS. 
3. Experimental Results 
3.1 Coupon Experiment 
 Simple t-tests over differences in coupon redemption for inexpensive shoes between 
treatment and control communities show that coupon redemption in treatment communities was 
32.8% relative to 33.6% in control communities using our vendor redemption data, lower where 
shoe donation occurred, but indicating a statistically insignificant difference in redemption rates 
(t = 0.26, tICC = 0.17, the latter accounting for intra-class correlation).  For expensive shoes, 
redemption rates were 32.7% in treatment communities and 35.0% in control communities, also 
statistically insignificant (t = 0.79, tICC = 0.50). We tested a further outcome that simply asked 
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whether a household redeemed either coupon. The fraction redeeming any coupon in treatment 
communities was 37.3% in treatment and 39.4% in control communities, again a statistically 
insignificant difference (t = 0.67, tICC = 0.43).  Using self-reported redemption data (where 40.2% 
of households reported redeeming a coupon compared to 38.2% from our vendor data) the 
difference is somewhat larger, 37.8% in treatment communities relative to 43.5% in control. The 
difference is statistically significant in a simple t-test at the 10% level, but statistically 
insignificant after accounting for intraclass correlation (t = 1.79, tICC = 1.13). 
Figure 3 shows demand curves for inexpensive and expensive shoes, respectively, based 
on the variable prices in our coupon experiment in the final two ADPs.  The dark blue line 
shows the demand curve at the three different sets of prices (given implicitly by the varying 
discounts of the randomly drawn coupons), the light blue, control. We do find that households 
are fairly sensitive to shoe prices, especially for expensive shoes. Figure 3 shows that coupon 
redemption rates in treatment communities for shoes costing more than $10 fall from 89% to 
26% as the value of the coupon discount decreases from 25% to 75%.  (In control communities, 
the fall in redemption rates is from 79% to 27%.)  Converting this into a price elasticity of 
demand yields an average elasticity of -1.06, larger than the -0.405 demand elasticity reported for 
similar shoes in Meredith et al. (2013).  Figure 3 shows little overall shift in the demand curve 
based on whether a community received shoe donations at any level of price. 
 Regression results for the impact on redemption of coupons for inexpensive shoes are 
shown in Table 2. In the first four columns we show linear probability (LP) model estimations 
using all four ADPs, both the first two ADPs in which we gave set dollar discounts and the 
second two ADPs in which households randomly drew a coupon and received either 25%, 50%, or 
75% discount on the purchase of new shoes.  The first column provides LP estimates without 
controls, the second column with a full set of controls, and the third and fourth columns provide 
estimations only for poorer households (homes with a dirt floor) and for households with more 
than two younger children under age 10.  The fifth and sixth columns replicate columns 1 and 2 
using only ADPs 3 and 4.  Point estimates from OLS estimations in columns 1 and 2 (with and 
without controls) yield identical point estimates, showing that the impact of the donations 
reduced coupon redemption rates by 2.30 percentage points.  The fact that we obtain the same 
estimates with and without controls appears to indicate the similarity of control variables across 
our communities and that control variables are very closely orthogonal to treatment assignment.  
Both estimates are statistically insignificant, and yield no conclusive evidence for a negative 
impact on local markets.6  Estimations for poorer households in column 3 and households with 
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young children yield in column 4 similar insignificant impacts as do the final columns 5 and 6 
estimated only in ADPs 3 and 4 where the large percentage coupon discounts were offered. 
 Impacts of the shoe donations on the redemption of coupons for expensive shoes in 
Table 3 yield similarly negative point estimates on shoe market impact, but point estimates are 
again small and statistically insignificant. Point estimates from OLS estimations in columns 1 
and 2 yield point estimates of -0.033 without controls and -0.022 with controls, respectively. The 
point estimate of negative market impacts for families with more than two young children 
appears to be a little bit higher at -0.060, but is again statistically insignificant. Results using 
only ADPs 3 and 4 in columns 5 and six also yield negative but insignificant point estimates. 
 Table 4 shows regressions on households redeeming either one or both of the inexpensive 
shoe and expensive shoe coupons as a function of treated and untreated status and controls.  
Point estimates for negative impacts on the market are very close across all six columns, ranging 
from -0.024 to -0.041, but none are statistically significant.  Table 5 gives results for 
self-reported coupon redemption data. The results using the self-reported data show larger 
effects than our vendor-reported data, although there is only a two percentage point difference 
between the two redemption rates and the correlation between the two is very strong (0.790).  
While the impacts in Table 5 are roughly double that of the vendor reported data, they remain 
statistically insignificant.  As a result, we find that in each of our 24 estimates from our coupon 
experiment, we find point estimates within a very tight range that are indicative of some small 
negative impact of donated shoes on market purchases of shoes, but none of these point estimates 
is large enough to obtain statistical significance even at the 10% level. 
3.2 Difference-in-differences Estimation 
 Households were asked in the follow-up survey to record shoe purchases for every 
individual in the household over the previous three months since the baseline survey.  We carry 
out simple t-tests with purchase data on each member of the household to see if reported shoe 
purchases declined during this period among treated households relative to control households. 
These tests reveal that 13.8% of members of households in treated communities purchased shoes 
within the previous three months of the follow-up survey, compared to 17.4% of individuals in 
control communities, a difference statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value 3.44).  When 
we restrict reported purchases to children between 6 and 12 years, which should be most affected 
by the shoe donations, the difference is still significant at the 1% level, 22.3% in treated 
communities compared to 29.2% in control communities (t-value 3.01). 
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   Difference-in-difference estimations that control for individual characteristics and 
include ADP-level fixed effects reveal lower shoe purchases among children in treated 
communities that are nearly identical in magnitude to those we estimate from our coupon 
experiment.  These LP difference-in-difference estimates show a decline in the probability of the 
shoe purchase of -0.041.  Adding controls in column 2 yields an estimate very close to this of 
-0.038.  Columns 3 and 4 showing the impacts on market shoe purchases for poor households 
and households with more young children are just slightly smaller. 
The final two columns in Table 5 break down spillovers on shoe purchases for children 
not only in the age 6 to 12 range who received donated shoes, but for children under six (column 
5) and for teenagers age 13 to 19 (column 6). As we might expect, point estimates indicate that 
the donations likely replaced market shoe purchases more extensively for the younger children, 
and they range from -0.053 to -0.058 for the age 6 to 12 group and the under six group, 
respectively. The interpretation of these coefficients is that being a child in a home who received 
a pair of donated shoes resulted in a roughly 5 percentage point reduction in the probability that 
a market purchase of shoes was made for that child during the three months previous to the 
follow-up survey, although none of the estimates are statistically significant. Point estimates for 
market shoe purchases for teenagers age 13 to 19 are -0.024 and -0.036 without and with 
controls, respectively.  One could interpret this as that the most likely impact of the TOMS shoe 
donations is that every 20 pairs of shoes donated in a village results in about one less pair of shoes 
purchased in the market for young children. 
In both our experimental and difference-in-difference estimations, we find little evidence 
that would support the existence of a utility function similar to (2), in which households increase 
purchases of, for example, shoes in order to provide shoes for children who were not beneficiaries 
of the donation. Overall, we find more evidence for the utility function given in (1), where 
donated goods may slightly decrease purchases of the same good in local markets.  Although 
our point estimates are very consistent across specifications and estimation strategies, they are 
consistently small. Although they fail to reach statistical significance, 30 out of 30 of our 
estimates point to negative impacts on market purchases in the -2.2 to -7.0 percentage point 
range.  Given a mean in the control of shoe purchases for 6 to 12 year olds of 29.2% and a 
standard deviation of 45.5 percentage points, we consistently estimate a drop in the probability of 
a market shoe purchase of 0.048 to 0.153 standard deviations.  We also cannot completely rule 
out from our results that the household utility function looks similar to that in (3), where the 
receipt of the donated pair of shoes is viewed as a distinct and new good that increases household 
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utility and has essentially zero impact on the marginal utility of both the donated good and other 
goods across members of the household.  However, given the heavy usage of the shoes among 
recipient children and reported happiness with the shoes, it is clear that their marginal utility is 
high, leading us to believe that the utility function in (1) is operative and that the donated shoes 
are likely to be substituting to a small degree for market shoe purchases.  
3.3 Statistical Power and Robustness Checks 
Our treatment involved the free distribution of shoes, a consumer item that we believed 
to be valuable to our subjects. Given concerns that randomization at the household level could 
promote jealousies between households, it was preferred by a number of parties to the study that 
we carry out a cluster randomization at the community level rather than a standard 
household-level randomization to mitigate this potential problem. 
We address this issue and how it relates to the power of our tests in the paper in three 
ways.  First, our estimate of intra-class correlation gives us some basis for carrying out power 
calculations that account for any clustering of shoe-buying behavior within the communities in 
our sample.  For example, while the standard error for the classical test in difference in 
proportions is [p(1-p)(1/n1 + 1/n2)]^0.5, the standard error including our variance inflation 
factor (Hedges and Hedburg, 2007) becomes ([1 + (m – 1)ρ][p(1-p)(1/n1 + 1/n2)])^0.5, where m 
is the sample size in each cluster.  For our study this means that the standard error in our 
estimates becomes inflated from 0.0315 to 0.0494, given our (treated) n1 = 563 and (control) n2 = 
416, ρ = 0.0334, and our average cluster size m = 45 households. At 80% power and alpha = 0.05, 
the minimum detectable effect lies 2.8 standard errors from the null (t + t = 1.96 + 0.84).  This 
makes our minimum detectable effect 0.138 or 0.284 standard deviations.  We consistently find 
reductions in shoe market purchases that are about one-third the magnitude of this level. 
A reasonable question one might ask is how much difference would an expansion of the 
sample in our experiment made in obtaining a statistically significant result?  In other words, if 
we were to, for example, double the sample size and number of clusters, how much lower would 
coupon redemption rates had to have been in the treatment group of this added part of the sample 
to reject the null of zero impact of the donations on market shoe purchases?  Accounting for 
intraclass correlation, we ran simulations to this end, which indicate for a doubling of clusters 
and sample size, that non-rejection of the null is robust to a full one-standard-error lower 
redemption rate in the mean of the treated group of an expanded sample population.  In other 
words, for this doubling of the sample size to result in rejection of the null hypothesis, the mean 
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redemption rate in our experiment within the new treated households would have to have be a 
full standard error lower than in the sample we actually obtained.  For the cheap coupon 
redemption statistic, the treated mean in the new augmented part of the sample would have to be 
a full two standard errors below the mean in our sample.  And in the self-reported data (where 
coupon redemption is lower among the treated), the treated mean would have to be about 1.6 
standard deviations below the mean in our existing sample. Thus even a doubling of the sample 
size could have allowed for a rejection of the null of no impact, but it is unlikely.  Moreover, 
given the fixed costs inherent to our field design of obtaining the necessary permissions and 
personnel to carry out local surveys in each community, does not allow for a simple trade-off of 
smaller clusters for more clusters (communities involved in the study).  Given the low intraclass 
correlation, the balance achieved across household characteristics through the cluster 
randomization, and the use of the baseline study in the difference-in-difference estimations, it is 
unlikely that additional clusters (up to any reasonable level of field budget) would have yielded 
the statistical power to reject the null of zero impact on market shoe purchases. 
To check for robustness across different potential treatment assignments in our 18 
communities, we carried out a modified version of Fischer’s exact test (which is often used on 
very small samples or in instances with very few clusters) using randomization inference.  In a 
classic use of randomization inference, one would carry out a placebo test to examine the 
t-statistic that corresponds to every permutation of possible placebo treatment.  In other words, 
one considers every possible permutation of treatment assignment, calculating t-statics for each 
hypothetical treatment and control group, and then checks to see if the t-statistic of the true 
treatment assignment falls above the 95th percentile of t-statistics in this exhaustive set of 
treatment permutations.  Because our number of clusters is much larger than normal for this 
exercise, we carried out a simulation in Stata of 1000 random assignments to treatment (where in 
each of our four World Vision ADP regions, 2-3 communities were randomly assigned to 
treatment.  Based on this simulation, we find that our actual t-statistic on our true treatment 
assignment ranked in approximately the 56th percentile of the set of 1000 placebo simulations in 
our coupon experiment t-tests, our coupon redemption regression ranked in the 64th percentile, 
and our difference-in-difference regression in the 70th percentile.  The result is that the behavior 
of our treated households falls in the middle of the pack relative to 1000 simulations of false 
treatment assignment, meaning that despite the relatively low number of clusters, there is no 
reason to think that coupon redemption or shoe purchases were altered in any significant way by 
the true (random) assignment to treatment. 
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4. Conclusion 
Our experimental study among 979 households in El Salvador finds modest evidence to 
support the hypothesis that donated shoes exhibit negative impacts on local shoe markets.  We 
view El Salvador in many ways as an ideal context to test the impact of in-kind donations on local 
markets because, although there are many children who do not wear shoes out-of-doors, most 
children do own two or three pairs of shoes, providing greater scope for finding a negative 
impact on local markets than a context in which shoe ownership, and hence market purchases, 
are rare. Indeed there are many countries such as El Salvador, which are large recipients of 
donated shoes and clothing, but where existing ownership of these goods is relatively common 
compared to developing countries with even lower income levels. 
While all of our regression estimates lie in the direction of slightly negative impacts on 
household shoe purchases, they fail to reach statistical significance, and thus we cannot present 
conclusive evidence pointing to a negative impact on domestic markets from in-kind donations. 
We approach our analysis by using two different measures of market impact: measuring relative 
redemption rates of shoe coupons good in local shoe stores, and by examining whether shoe 
purchases among children eligible for shoe donations declined relative to others in the household 
in treated communities versus the same difference in control communities.  While simple t-tests 
in our latter estimations reveal significantly lower shoe purchases among households who 
received shoe donations, after controlling for household and parental characteristics as well as 
ADP-level fixed effects, we can uncover no statistically significant negative impact on shoe 
purchases in local markets. 
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Figure 1: Days per Week Children Wear Donated Shoes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Breakdown of Children’s Activities While Wearing Donated Shoes 
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Figure 3: Demand Curve for Inexpensive and Expensive Shoes 
   *In ADPs 3 and 4 only.  Based on assumption of 1/3 distribution of coupons between households. Source: Shevloff (2013). 
  
20 
 
Table 1: Means of Control Variables and Balance Tests 
Variable Control 
Mean 
Control 
Std. Dev. 
Treatment 
Mean 
Treatment 
Std. Dev. 
 
p-value 
      
Household Characteristics:      
Parental Education 4.8725 2.5146 4.7060 2.1114 0.2611 
      
Log of Land Holdings 7.9754 1.2539 8.0504 1.6526 0.4464 
      
Electricity in House 0.6875 0.4641 0.6732 0.4695 0.6355 
      
Has Mobile Phone 1.3744 0.9349 1.2977 0.9271 0.2035 
      
Television in Household 0.7609 0.4804 0.7041 0.5360 0.0881 
      
Number Family Members 5.4602 1.7605 5.3387 1.9556 0.3170 
      
Household Age--Average 22.7929 6.5586 23.3779 7.2831 0.1955 
      
Minutes to Shoe Store 98.8337 3.3871 98.8770 2.9132 0.8306 
      
House has Dirt Floor 0.6058 0.4893 0.6732 0.4695 0.0294** 
      
Number of Children <10 2.5144 0.0967 2.5239 0.0824 0.9400 
      
Baseline Shoe Purchase 0.265 0.442 0.245 0.430 0.3788 
(6 Months Before Baseline)      
      
Coupon Redemption:      
Redeemed Cheap Shoes 
Coupon 
0.3341 0.4723 0.3250 0.4688 0.7650 
      
Redeemed Expensive Shoes 
Coupon 
0.3462 0.4763 0.3268 0.4695 0.5269 
      
Redeemed Cheap and/or 
Expensive Shoes Coupon 
0.3942 0.4893 0.3730 0.4840 0.4997 
      
Redeemed Any Coupon 
(Self Reported) 
0.4350 0.4963 0.3783 0.4854 0.0735* 
      
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table 2: Impact on Purchases of Inexpensive Shoes (< $10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Cheap Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Cheap Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Cheap Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Cheap Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Cheap Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Cheap Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
 All Four ADPs Final Two ADPs 
 No Controls Full Controls Dirt Floor >2 Yng Chldr No Controls Full Controls 
Received Shoe Donation  -0.023 -0.023 -0.008 -0.022 -0.009 -0.020 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.053) (0.058) (0.110) (0.113) 
Log of Land Holdings  0.014 0.008 0.012  0.014 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.011) 
Home has Electricity  0.035* -0.005 0.057**  0.056 
  (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.029) 
Home has Dirt floor  -0.005  0.010  0.017 
  (0.029)  (0.044)  (0.050) 
Family has > 2 Cells  0.023 0.052* 0.009  0.053 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.033)  (0.040) 
Family has Television  -0.035 -0.011 -0.041  -0.033 
  (0.025) (0.030) (0.034)  (0.040) 
Household Size  0.006 0.006 0.007  -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.011) 
Minutes to Shoe Store  0.002 0.003 0.003  -0.000 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.009) 
Average Household Age  0.000 -0.003 0.002  0.005 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.005) 
Education Parents  0.043 0.041 0.030  0.060 
  (0.028) (0.044) (0.042)  (0.044) 
Num. of Child. under 10  -0.003 -0.005   0.011 
  (0.008) (0.012)   (0.008) 
Parental Education  -0.001 -0.008 0.000  -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.014) 
Constant 0.342*** 0.168 0.280* 0.100 0.504*** 0.219 
 (0.051) (0.113) (0.136) (0.105) (0.097) (0.158) 
       
Observations 979 943 608 691 517 494 
R-squared 0.001 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.017 
Clustered standard errors at community level in parentheses. All estimations include 
region-level fixed effects.  Column 3 limits sample to households with a dirt floor, column 4 to 
households with more than 2 children under 10 old. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table 3: Impact on Purchases of Expensive Shoes (>= $10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Expensive 
Shoe Coupon 
Redemption 
Expensive 
Shoe Coupon 
Redemption 
Expensive 
Shoe Coupon 
Redemption 
Expensive 
Shoe Coupon 
Redemption 
Expensive 
Shoe Coupon 
Redemption 
Expensive 
Shoe Coupon 
Redemption 
 All Four ADPs Final Two ADPs 
 No Controls Full Controls Dirt Floor >2 Yng Chldr No Controls Full Controls 
Received Shoe Donation  -0.033 -0.022 -0.035 -0.060 -0.019 -0.022 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.093) (0.105) 
Log of Land Holdings  0.008 -0.003 0.016  0.008 
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.018) 
Home has Electricity  0.013 -0.021 0.008  -0.010 
  (0.038) (0.036) (0.039)  (0.061) 
Home has Dirt floor  -0.049  -0.028  -0.063 
  (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.051) 
Family has > 2 Cells  -0.001 0.033 -0.004  0.045 
  (0.037) (0.043) (0.041)  (0.063) 
Family has Television  -0.012 0.001 -0.018  0.008 
  (0.030) (0.040) (0.030)  (0.047) 
Household Size  0.005 0.005 0.013  0.007 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.013) 
Minutes to Shoe Store  0.003 0.004 0.002  0.000 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) 
Average Household Age  0.002 0.002 0.003  0.006* 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Education Parents  0.027 0.036 0.016  0.008 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.040) 
Num. of Children under 10  0.004 0.010   0.017 
  (0.009) (0.013)   (0.010) 
Parental Education  0.001 -0.003 0.004  0.000 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.010) 
Constant 0.354*** 0.171 0.193 0.073 0.527*** 0.261 
 (0.044) (0.130) (0.132) (0.160) (0.083) (0.212) 
       
Observations 979 943 608 691 517 494 
R-squared 0.001 0.012 0.013 0.020 0.000 0.019 
Clustered standard errors at community level in parentheses. All estimations include 
region-level fixed effects.  Column 3 limits sample to households with a dirt floor, column 4 to 
households with more than 2 children under 10 old. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table 4: Impact on Purchases of All Shoes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
 All Four ADPs Final Two ADPs 
 No Controls Full Controls Dirt Floor >2 Yng Chldr No Controls Full Controls 
Received Shoe Donation  -0.037 -0.025 -0.024 -0.041 -0.029 -0.036 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.063) (0.064) (0.115) (0.126) 
Log of Land Holdings  0.010 0.000 0.012  0.012 
  (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)  (0.014) 
Home has Electricity  0.019 -0.017 0.040  -0.009 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)  (0.057) 
Home has Dirt floor  -0.027  -0.001  -0.041 
  (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.050) 
Family has > 2 Cells  0.010 0.038 0.006  0.045 
  (0.034) (0.040) (0.042)  (0.053) 
Family has Television  -0.008 0.001 -0.006  0.029 
  (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)  (0.056) 
Household Size  0.011 0.009 0.014*  0.010 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.011) 
Minutes to Shoe Store  0.004 0.006 0.004  -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.009) 
Average Household Age  0.001 -0.001 0.002  0.004 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) 
Education Parents  0.046 0.054 0.035  0.041 
  (0.030) (0.038) (0.040)  (0.050) 
Num. of Children under 10  -0.004 -0.001   0.003 
  (0.008) (0.012)   (0.009) 
Parental Education  -0.001 -0.006 0.001  0.000 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.012) 
Constant 0.403*** 0.203 0.274* 0.091 0.593*** 0.359 
 (0.051) (0.119) (0.137) (0.136) (0.098) (0.194) 
       
Observations 979 943 608 691 517 494 
R-squared 0.002 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.001 0.023 
Clustered standard errors at community level in parentheses. All estimations include 
region-level fixed effects.  Column 3 limits sample to households with a dirt floor, column 4 to 
households with more than 2 children under 10 old. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table 5: Impact on Purchases of All Shoes, Self Reported Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
Any Shoe 
Coupon 
Redemption 
 All Four ADPs Final Two ADPs 
 No Controls Full Controls Dirt Floor >2 Yng Chldr No Controls Full Controls 
Received Shoe Donation  -0.070 -0.061 -0.070 -0.048 -0.071 -0.094 
 (0.064) (0.061) (0.058) (0.063) (0.111) (0.107) 
Log of Land Holdings  0.004 -0.003 0.006  0.008 
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)  (0.016) 
Home has Electricity  -0.044 -0.072** -0.006  -0.112*** 
  (0.028) (0.033) (0.027)  (0.032) 
Home has Dirt floor  -0.057*  -0.022  -0.086 
  (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.048) 
Family has > 2 Cells  0.037 0.067 0.033  0.047 
  (0.033) (0.039) (0.036)  (0.047) 
Family has Television  0.033 0.045 0.046  0.088* 
  (0.031) (0.038) (0.029)  (0.041) 
Household Size  -0.004 -0.003 0.006  -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.011) 
Minutes to Shoe Store  0.002 0.005 0.002  -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) 
Average Household Age  0.003 0.001 0.002  0.009** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Education Parents  0.089** 0.093** 0.065  0.112* 
  (0.032) (0.034) (0.048)  (0.055) 
Num. of Children under 10  0.004 0.008   0.016 
  (0.010) (0.012)   (0.012) 
Parental Education  0.004 -0.001 0.004  0.006 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.009) 
Constant 0.443*** 0.314** 0.312* 0.235 0.635*** 0.455* 
 (0.048) (0.149) (0.167) (0.141) (0.089) (0.214) 
       
Observations 979 943 608 691 517 494 
R-squared 0.006 0.030 0.033 0.020 0.005 0.061 
Clustered standard errors at community level in parentheses. All estimations include 
region-level fixed effects.  Column 3 limits sample to households with a dirt floor, column 4 to 
households with more than 2 children under 10 old. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table 6: Impact on Purchases of All Shoes (Differences-in-Differences) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES New Shoes in 
Last 3 Mo. 
New Shoes in 
Last 3 Mo. 
New Shoes in 
Last 3 Mo. 
New Shoes in 
Last 3 Mo. 
New Shoes in 
Last 3 Mo. 
New Shoes in 
Last 3 Mo. 
  
No Controls 
 
Full Controls 
 
Dirt Floor 
 
>2 Yng Chldr 
Impact on 
Siblings 
Impact on 
Siblings 
RSD*Age6to12 -0.041 -0.038 -0.028 -0.031 -0.058 -0.053 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.067) (0.072) (0.073) 
RSD*Under6     -0.055 -0.054 
     (0.034) (0.034) 
RSD*Age13to19     -0.024 -0.036 
     (0.028) (0.028) 
Rec’d Shoe Donation -0.019 -0.011 -0.033 -0.015 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027) 
age6to12 0.160*** 0.120** 0.115* 0.116** 0.156*** 0.162** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.056) (0.050) (0.051) (0.057) 
under6     0.012 0.029 
     (0.024) (0.026) 
age13to19     0.075*** 0.099*** 
     (0.022) (0.020) 
age  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hhshoebuy  0.054** 0.046* 0.045*  0.054** 
  (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)  (0.019) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.196** 0.202*** 0.175* 0.142*** 0.152* 
 (0.020) (0.090) (0.058) (0.097) (0.024) (0.087) 
       
Observations 5,046 4,816 3,150 3,775 5,037 4,816 
R-squared 0.033 0.053 0.051 0.049 0.045 0.059 
 
RSD = Received Shoe Donation. Clustered standard errors at community level in parentheses. 
All estimations include region-level fixed effects. Column 3 limits sample to households with a 
dirt floor, column 4 to households with more than 2 children under 10 old. Regressions also 
include controls for electricity in household, dirt floor (except column 3), cell phone ownership, 
television, household size, minutes to shoe store, education of parents, number of young 
children (except column 4), and parental education. (None of these controls is statistically 
significant to p < 0.10.)  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1See for example public criticisms such as Wadhams (2010), Nemana (2010), and Easterly (2012). 
 
2Our registry can be viewed online at http://www.povertyactionlab.org/Hypothesis-Registry.  Casey, 
Glennerster, and Miguel (2012) present a detailed exposition of the advantages of pre-analysis plans and hypothesis 
registry to development researchers.  Hypothesis registry was particularly important in the case of our study, in 
which we investigate the impact of a donation program operated by a significant funder of our fieldwork with an 
interest in ascertaining the different impacts of its own program. 
3The few minor changes to the specification of our estimations were made at the request of referees.  
  
4This specification differs slightly from our hypothesis registry in that in our coupon experiment we use only 
follow-up data. 
 
6 We carry out our estimations using clustered standard errors at the community level. Because our number of 
communities offers a borderline case over which clustered standard errors are appropriate, we also carry out 
regressions (not shown) using robust standard errors which yield essentially identical results. 
